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Michael D. Hurd and Naohiro Yashiro 
A common theme of the papers in this volume, by both the Japanese and the 
U.S. authors, is that population aging in these two countries will have both 
micro- and macroeffects and that in some cases these effects will be substan- 
tial. The most obvious effects will be on the social programs that specifically 
serve the elderly, such as the public pension  systems and provisions for the 
medical needs of the elderly. But aging will also affect labor markets, capital 
markets, the housing market, and the market for health care services. It will 
affect firms through their participation in the demand side of the labor market 
and through their provisions for pensions. Aging will have macroeffects on 
saving rates, the rate of return on assets, the balance of payments, and, most 
likely, economic growth. 
The fraction of the population that is elderly (aged 65 or over) is expected 
to increase rapidly in Europe, the United  States, and Japan as the result of 
falling fertility rates, the aging of the baby boom cohort, and increases in life 
expectancy at age 65 (Hurd, chap. 2 in this volume; Yashiro and Oishi, chap. 
3 in this volume). The change is likely to be particularly rapid in Japan. For 
example, the elderly made up about 12 percent of the Japanese population in 
1990; they are forecast to be 25 percent of the population by 2020. By compari- 
son the corresponding change in the United States will be rather modest: from 
12 percent to  16 percent. The working-age population  (aged  15-64)  has al- 
ready started to decline in Japan, whereas it will continue to grow for several 
decades in the United States. 
The most important cause of the difference between forecasts for the Japa- 
nese and U.S. populations, particularly in the long run (more than 30 years in 
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the future), is the assumption about the fertility rate. In 1990 the fertility rate 
in Japan was 1.6 births per woman, whereas in the United States it was about 
2. I.  A second reason for more rapid aging in Japan is more rapid growth in life 
expectancy at age 65. In Japan between 1960 and 1990 the life expectancy of 
both women and men increased by  about 40 percent, whereas in the United 
States the gains were 19 and 16 percent for women and men, respectively. The 
increase in life expectancy will lead to a large increase in the elderly popula- 
tion after the large baby boom cohort reaches age 65. 
Even if the increase in the elderly population were the same in the two coun- 
tries, we would expect the consequences of aging to differ because of institu- 
tional and cultural differences. Indeed, an objective of the JCER-NBER con- 
ferences is to try to understand economic behavior better by  observing how 
these differences cause behavior to be different. The main objective of this 
Introduction will be to make some comparisons, drawing on the results of the 
papers in this volume. 
As measured by  income the elderly in the two countries are about as well 
off as the nonelderly (Yashiro, chap. 4). The composition of income, however, 
is very different. The elderly in Japan are much more dependent on public 
pensions. A good benchmark is the fraction of the elderly that get 80 percent 
or more of their income from public pensions. In Japan about half of elderly 
couples who live independently and about three-fourths of nonworking elderly 
couples receive more than 80 percent from public pensions (Takayama, chap. 
10). In the United States, only about one-fifth of elderly couples get at least 80 
percent of their income from Social Security. One explanation for the differ- 
ence stems from the differing structure of the public pension system: Japan has 
a basic pension that provides a minimum level for all to which is added a 
wage-related component, which can be substantial. In the United States, Social 
Security benefits increase at just 0.15 of average indexed monthly earnings in 
the top bracket with the result that the maximum benefit is low compared with 
Table 1  Comparison of Demographic Characteristics and Projections 
Percentage of 
Population 65 
Fertility Ratio  Life Expectancy at 65  or  Over 
Japan  us. 
Year  Japan  US.  Males  Females  Males  Females  Japan  U.S. 
1960  2.00  3.61  11.6  14.1  12.9  15.9  5.7  15.9 
1990  1.55  2.07  16.2  20.0  15.0  19.0  12.0  12.3 
2020  1.80  1.90  17.8  22.6  16.5  20.2  25.5  16.4 
Sources: For Japan, Ato et al. (1992); for the United States, Board of  Trustees of the Federal 
OASDI Trust Funds (1994). 3  Introduction 
the earnings of many workers. Thus, there is a greater need for private pensions 
in the United States. 
The Japanese elderly have more income from earnings because their labor 
force participation  rate is considerably higher. They have considerably less 
asset income because they hold a much greater fraction of their wealth in the 
form of housing. Besides the obvious explanation of  very large increases in 
housing and land prices in Japan, this great housing wealth is partly the result 
of the high rate of homeownership among the Japanese elderly. It is likely that 
the elderly retain their homes because of the very low property taxes in Japan, 
and because of the custom of bequeathing the house to a child in exchange for 
the child’s taking care of the elderly parents. 
Comparisons of income and wealth between the Japanese and U.S. elderly 
are tenuous, however, because of the very large difference in living arrange- 
ments (Yashiro, chap. 4). In Japan, about 33 percent of elderly women and 42 
percent of elderly men either live alone or with their spouses, compared with 
81 and 91 percent in the United States, respectively. The rest live in extended 
households in which the elderly person is not the head of the household. This 
fact has two consequences. First, because of returns to scale in consumption it 
is difficult to assess the economic status of individuals in multiperson house- 
holds. Second, when an elderly person is not the head of  the household, the 
income of the household is associated with the nonelderly head, so that figures 
on the average income of the elderly cover only about 40 percent of the elderly. 
In that the well-to-do elderly tend to live independently and the less well-to- 
do tend to live in extended families, the percentage included in income statis- 
tics falls with economic status. For example, only 28 percent of those in the 
lowest income quintile (those who are household  heads) are covered in the 
household statistics. As a consequence, age-income or age-wealth paths will 
be too steep because at older ages only the wealthy of the cohort are included 
in the sample (Yashiro, chap. 4). There is no easy or obvious solution to this 
data problem: the income and assets of the elderly who live in extended fami- 
lies are reported with the income and assets of the family unit. 
Having said this, we do not mean to imply that we cannot learn a good deal 
from the available data. There are several major household-level surveys, and 
for the most part, they form the basis of the empirical papers in this volume. 
The most widely used is the Monthly Report on the Family Income and Expen- 
diture Suwey (MRFIE), which is published by the Management and Coordina- 
tion Agency (MCA). The National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure 
(NSFIE) is the most extensive survey on households, but it is published only 
every five years by the MCA. The NSFIE covers a number of types of house- 
holds, including single persons and nonworking households, that are not cov- 
ered by  the MRFIE. The Basic Survey on People’s Life by  the Ministry of 
Welfare has extensive information on family income and savings by  type of 
household, and it partly includes information on the single elderly. Nonethe- 4  Michael D. Hurd and Naohiro Yashiro 
less, the problem of constructing a sample that is representative of elderly indi- 
viduals remains in all of these surveys. 
In the United States there has been a considerable volume of research based 
on household-level data aimed at verifying the life-cycle hypothesis about con- 
sumption (LCH). In Japan there has been a good deal of research about the 
consequences of aging for the national saving rate: under the LCH the pro- 
jected aging of the population will cause the saving rate to fall because the 
elderly consume more of their income than the nonelderly. However, because 
of data limitations it has been difficult to verify or even study the LCH at the 
microlevel. First, cross-sectional wealth holdings may not give a good estimate 
of the wealth paths of individuals because it is hard to control for cohort ef- 
fects, living arrangements, and differential mortality. In the United States these 
problems are overcome by using panel data, but in Japan there are no panel 
data. Second, in synthetic cohorts there is no control for differential mortality 
or living arrangements. Third, because consumption is difficult to measure 
in household surveys, it is often underestimated,  so saving rates are overesti- 
mated. Fourth, because of the high rate of homeownership among the elderly, 
the apparent high saving rate in old age would be reduced were the implicit 
high income and consumption flows from housing taken into account; this ad- 
justment would make the lifetime pattern of consumption and saving conform 
more closely to a life-cycle pattern. 
An alternative to studies based on household data is to estimate directly the 
effect on the national  saving rate of  changes in the age composition of the 
population.  In the context of the LCH, however, age is not just years since 
birth. Age should also take into account life expectancy: holding age constant, 
an increase in life expectancy should increase an individual’s saving rate and 
retirement age. Indeed, in the forecasts of Yashiro and Oishi (chap. 3), which 
control for increases in life expectancy, the national saving rate would be 10 
percent in 2020-25  rather than -5  percent with no change in life expectancy. 
In the United States, even though the household saving rate as measured in 
panel data varies with age, the aging of the population will probably have only 
small  effects on household-level  saving: the  life-cycle pattern  is not  large 
enough to produce a substantial aggregate change because the population will 
age rather slowly (Hurd, chap. 2). But, as pointed out by Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise  (chap. 9), saving for retirement purposes through employer-provided 
pension plans is a large fraction of total personal saving in the United States: 
in 1989 this kind of saving amounted to about $120 billion; personal saving as 
measured in the national income and product accounts amounted to $152 bil- 
lion. Changes in the fraction of the population that works could cause substan- 
tial changes in this kind of saving. Indeed, Schieber and Shoven (chap. 5) esti- 
mate that real saving through private pensions, which is now almost 4 percent 
of payroll, will become negative in about 2024. 
Another aspect of saving for retirement through private pensions is that we 
expect the consumption rate of  annuitized wealth to be higher than the con- 5  Introduction 
sumption rate of bequeathable wealth. The reasoning is that if there is no be- 
quest motive, a cohort will completely consume its annuitized wealth by  the 
time the last survivor dies whereas a cohort will accidentally bequeath (not 
consume) some fraction of its bequeathable wealth. If  there is a bequest mo- 
tive, the difference will be reduced but not eliminated. In the United States, 
retirement saving through 401 (k) plans and, to a lesser extent, individual retire- 
ment accounts is becoming the primary mode of retirement saving. This trend 
should increase the fraction of wealth that is annuitized in the United States 
and by  itself reduce the saving rate. In Japan, little retirement income comes 
from private pensions, and as a result, little household wealth is in the form of 
private pensions: in 1992 pension reserves were 4 percent of household finan- 
cial assets in Japan whereas they were 28 percent in the United States (Yamau- 
chi, chap. 6). 
There are a number of similarities in the pattern and determinants of retire- 
ment in Japan and in the United States. In both countries the labor force partici- 
pation rate of 60-64-year-old  males fell rather sharply during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, a period when real public pension benefits increased rapidly. Par- 
ticularly in Japan, where most retirees are heavily dependent on income from 
public pensions, it is hard to imagine that the decline would have happened 
without the increase in pensions. Workers seem to be very responsive to retire- 
ment incentives. In Japan there is substantial bunching of workers at the point 
on the  annual budget constraint where the earnings test  becomes binding 
(Seike, chap. 12),  just as in the United States. In Japan the structure of separa- 
tion pay (a lump-sum defined-benefit  pension) is very similar to a typical back- 
loaded defined-benefit pension in the United States. This structure causes an- 
nual compensation to increase substantially until separation, and in the United 
States it reduces worker mobility before separation (Lumsdaine, Stock, and 
Wise, chap. 11). In both countries, the public pension system encourages re- 
tirement at age 65 in that the increase in benefits from a year's work after age 
65 is less than the actuarially fair increase. Consequently, the labor force par- 
ticipation rate falls sharply after age 65. 
There are, however, a number of differences between the labor markets. The 
most striking is the rate of work among the elderly. For example, in 1992 the 
labor force participation rate of 65-69-year-old  Japanese men was 56.5 per- 
cent.' In the United States just 25.9 percent of  men aged 65-69  were in the 
labor force. Part of the explanation for the high participation rate of the elderly 
in Japan is the prevalence of  self-employment: among male workers aged 70 
or over, 64 percent were self-employed or worked for other family members. 
This kind of employment offers flexibility in the choice of  hours, which can 
keep workers in the labor force. In addition, however, we  imagine that the 
difference in the number of expected years of retirement could be an important 
determinant of  the differences in retirement patterns. As we  discussed pre- 
1. Of these, 80.6  percent worked full time 6  Michael D. Hurd and Naohiro Yashiro 
viously, the increase in life expectancy at age 65 has been much greater in 
Japan, so it is reasonable to suppose that retirement-age workers forecast even 
greater future increases in life expectancy. Furthermore, in Japan mandatory 
retirement from the career job is mostly at age 60, while in the United States, 
where mandatory retirement is illegal, the retirement hazard rate has large 
peaks at ages 62 and 65. The net result is that a 60-year-old retiree in Japan 
probably anticipates financing many more years of  retirement than a 62- or 
65-year-old worker in the United States, possibly as many as seven or eight 
more years. 
Financial explanations probably play a role. Few retired Japanese have in- 
come from private pensions: most separation pay is a lump sum, which benefits 
from favorable tax treatment. In the United States many defined-benefit  private 
pensions encourage retirement, and new jobs are difficult to find for older 
workers.* In addition, some private pensions are employment conditioned so 
that pension income is lost if earnings are too great. This, of course, would not 
be the case in Japan, where separation pay is a lump sum. 
The overall financial wealth of the Japanese elderly may be less than that of 
the U.S. elderly, although because of  the difference in living arrangements it 
is hard to be precise. What is clear is the important difference in the level and 
composition of total wealth due to the value of housing. In 1989, the average 
value of housing and land among those aged 70 or over was 82 million yen, or 
about $820,000, which represents about 84 percent of their  asset^.^ If this could 
be monetized either through the sale of housing or through home equity con- 
version  mortgages (reverse annuity mortgages), the income of  the elderly 
could be  increased substantially (Noguchi, chap. 8). However, because the 
children of  the elderly cannot afford to buy housing, most elderly live with 
their children in their own houses, which are eventually bequeathed to the chil- 
dren. The conclusion is that, although total wealth among the elderly is consid- 
erably higher in Japan than in the United States, the resources available for 
nonhousing consumption may not be any greater, and are possibly even less. 
This would encourage a longer work life. 
As we have indicated, the housing market apparently operates very differ- 
ently in the two countries. In the United States the evidence suggests (or at 
least does not contradict) some downsizing with age. This implies that housing 
prices may fall as the population ages, although, to the extent that the housing 
prices can be forecast from population change, adjustments in housing choice 
and in the supply of housing can moderate price change (Hoynes and McFad- 
den, chap. 7). Should prices fall as the baby boom generation moves past retire- 
ment, the ability to finance nonhousing consumption by reducing housing con- 
sumption will be reduced, and the baby boom generation may find itself with 
2. In the United States the wage rate falls by 35-50  percent when a postretirement job is taken. 
In Japan the wage falls by about 50 percent on a new job after the career job ends (usually at age 
60; Seike, chap. 12). 
3. This figure is calculated over independent households excluding singles. 7  Introduction 
fewer resources in retirement than anticipated. In Japan, children move in with 
their elderly parents because they cannot afford to buy a house, and then the 
house  is passed  on to the children.  Of  course, demographic  changes could 
cause housing prices to fall, but that would not affect the flow of real housing 
services of the two closely linked generations. A possible effect, however, is 
that  separation of the generations,  which has been happening  fairly slowly, 
could accelerate: if housing becomes more affordable, the working generation 
could choose to buy housing rather than live with parents. 
The public pension  system in Japan is in debt in the sense that promised 
future benefit payments are greater than the fund dedicated to paying the bene- 
fits (Hatta and Oguchi, chap. 14). That is, the public pension  system is not 
fully funded, and the amount of shortfall is about equal to the GNP. This has 
happened because of windfall gains to the start-up generation and because the 
future benefits of current workers exceed the value of their past contributions. 
As in the United States, this causes transfers across generations. 
Because of the aging of the population, keeping the system solvent will re- 
quire increases in tax rates: Ogura (chap.  1) forecasts that with no changes in 
benefit  structure, the tax rate will have to increase from 15 percent today to 
about 40 percent in 2040.4 This is much greater than the required increase in 
the tax rate in the United States: a more relevant comparison is with Germany 
or Austria, which forecast similar tax rates. The main causes of the very high 
rate are the replacement rate (about 60 percent in Japan compared with about 
45 percent in the United States), greater life expectancy, and low fertility. 
It seems unlikely  such a high tax rate will be realized, which means that 
benefits  will have to be reduced. In Japan, as in the United States, a natural 
response is to increase the age for full benefits because of the increase in life 
expectancy and better health. Increasing the age for full benefits to 65 from 60 
would reduce the required tax rate to about 35 percent. Indexing benefits to 
prices rather than wages and taxing benefits could reduce the required tax rate 
to about 25 percent. All of these reforms seem reasonable from the U.S. point 
of view because they are already part of the Social Security system. 
The part of the U.S. Social Security system that funds retirement benefits is 
forecast eventually to become negative, but the tax rates required to keep the 
fund solvent are not particularly large, especially from the Japanese point of 
view: in 2040 the cost rate is forecast to be greater than the income rate by 3.4 
percent of taxable payroll, which means that the fund would be stabilized if 
the tax rate were increased by 3.4 percent to 16.6 percent of taxable payroll 
(Hurd, chap. 2). This is, of course, very different from the 40 percent rate that 
is forecast for Japan. 
The major problem facing the U.S.  Social Security  system is health care 
costs. The increase in such costs is only moderately due to the aging of  the 
4. This is higher than the official government [orecasts because Ogura forecasts a lower total 
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population: most of the increase comes from price inflation in medical services 
and increasing real consumption per capita. If medical care costs are not con- 
trolled, they will probably eventually influence the Social Security retirement 
trust fund though interfund borrowing. 
In Japan the delivery of medical care to the elderly is also a major policy 
issue. While total medical costs have stabilized at 6 percent of national income 
for the last 10 years, the medical costs of those aged 70 or over have doubled, 
and their per capita consumption of medical services is about four times the 
average. An apparent cause is generous medical benefits, which have resulted 
in care being provided in hospitals rather than in less costly settings. 
We conclude by noting that, despite the differences in culture and social and 
government structure, there are many similarities in the economic status and 
behavior of the elderly in the two countries. Furthermore, some of the apparent 
differences are due to measurement: for example, even though the elderly in 
Japan have much higher saving rates than the elderly in the United States, the 
difference would be reduced if the saving rate of the dependent elderly (who 
are missing from Japanese household statistics) could be included. At the mac- 
rolevel both countries face substantial difficulties associated with population 
aging: in Japan the public pension system has a large cash surplus on current 
account, but in fact it has large future liabilities, just like the U.S. Social Secu- 
rity system. Although population aging in Japan will be much more rapid than 
in the United States, the effects from an associated fall in the saving rate may 
be  similar because Japan starts from a considerably higher saving rate. We 
believe that this volume shows that a comparison of similarities and differences 
can increase our understanding of  the possible future effects of  population 
aging in each of the two countries. 
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